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EARLY THOMIST RECEPTION OF AQUINAS’S CHRISTOLOGY: 
HENRY OF GORKUM 
 
Henk J.M. Schoot 
 
 
Medieval reflection on Christ is not among the popular subjects in present-
day theology or philosophy. Whatever we do know about the subject 
concerns the period between roughly 1150 and 1275, from Peter Lombard to 
Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, and certainly not the later medieval 
period. It is my contention, however, that for some particular reasons the 
period of late medieval theology, usually seen as a period of decline and 
decay, is in fact very interesting. This is not because of new and daring 
enterprises in theology or christology, but because of the opportunity it 
offers to test our interpretation of the great scholastics. Do those scholars 
who are closer to them in time and mentality than we are, interpret Thomas 
Aquinas’ christology, for instance, in the same way as we do? And even 
more interestingly, in the case of contemporary conflicting interpretations, 
can they be a guide to solving present-day conflicts? If so, what may we 
learn from this medieval christology, in our ongoing attempt to glimpse an 
understanding of Jesus Christ? Such an attempt, as undertaken in this paper, 
only makes sense against the background of my growing conviction that 
medieval christology does have an important contribution to make. 
In this study I will look at the interpretation of Aquinas’s christology as 
taught to his students by the fifteenth century artist and theologian Henry of 
Gorkum. We will study a typical piece of ‘scholastic’ theology; i.e. a type 
that is didactic in purpose, from which we may learn the essentials of the 
way in which Aquinas was interpreted in one of the leading theological 
environments of those days: Cologne, in Germany.  
I will do so in two steps, each divided into a further two stages. First, 
Aquinas’s christology, and then Henry’s interpretation of it. With respect to 
Aquinas, I will begin with an impression of the historical merits of 
Aquinas’s christology, and follow up with an outline of my own 
interpretation of it, stressing its linguistic and apophatic character. Next, 
regarding Henry of Gorkum, I will start by giving some biographical data, 
and then continue by studying his interpretation of Aquinas’s christology 
against the background of his theology of naming God.  
 
 
1. Aquinas’s christology: an impression of its historical merits 
 
There are at least three points on which Aquinas’s christology is credited 
 2 
with special merit: 
a) Aquinas was the first to provide a systematic solution to the dispute 
around the three theories for the hypostatic union that Peter Lombard 
mentions in his IV Libri Sententiarum (Book III, d. 6).
1
 Bonaventure says 
that, in his day, it is common opinion that one must interpret the incarnation 
according to what later became known as the subsistence theory: Christ’s 
human nature subsists in Christ’s divine person. This theory was held by 
such people as Robert of Melun, Alain de Lille and William of Auxerre. 
Aquinas’s endorsement of this subsistence theory which, according to 
Bonaventure, followed a general pattern, also meant a systematic refutation 
of the other two: the so-called habitus theory (Hugh of St. Victor, John of 




b) Aquinas was, after a long time, the first to draw the resurrection of 
Christ again into explicit theological consideration. Peter Lombard devotes 
no separate attention to the subject that Paul deems so crucial to Christian 
faith (1Cor 15). Aquinas, however, adds a new section (distinctio) in his 
commentary on Peter Lombard, and in the Summa Theologiae integrates the 
resurrection in his account of the things that ‘per ipsum Salvatorem 
nostrum, idest Deum incarnatum, sunt acta et passa’.
3
 
c) Aquinas was the first of the scholastics to give a systematic account 
of what were later called the mysteries of  the life and passion of Christ. In 
fact, he was the first to divide christology into two parts, the first of which is 
more speculative in nature, dealing with the hypostatic union and its 
consequences, the second concerning the history of Christ’s salvific acts.
4
 
                                                     
1 So says e.g. A.M. Hoffmann, the editor of the German translation of Aquinas’s 
christology in the Summa Theologiae (Des Menschensohnes Sein, Mittleramt und Mutter, 
Deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe, vol. 26 (Graz etc. 1957), pp. 435-609). 
2 Cf. my Christ the ‘Name’ of God. Thomas Aquinas on naming Christ (Louvain: Peeters, 
1993), chapter 4; the work of Walter H. Principe and also Lauge Olaf Nielsen, ‘Logic and the 
Hypostatic Union: Two Late Twelfth Century Responses to the Papal Condemnation of 
1177’, in Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of the symposium ‘The 
Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy’, ed. by Sten Ebbesen & Russell L. Friedman 
(Copenhagen 1999), 251-79. 
3 STh III prol.; see Wilhelmus G.B.M. Valkenberg, Words of the Living God. Place and 
Function of Holy Scripture in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Louvain: Peeters, 2000), 
chapter 2. 
4 Cf. Leo Scheffczyk, ‘Die Stellung des Thomas von Aquin in der Entwicklung der Lehre 
von den Mysteria Vitae Christi’, in Renovatio et Reformatio. Wider das Bild von ‘finsteren’ 
Mittelalter. Festschrift für L. Hödl ed. by M. Gerwing (Münster 1985), 44-70; id., ‘Die 
Bedeutung der mysterien des Lebens Jesu für Glauben und Leben des Christen’, in, Die 
Mysterien des Lebens Jesu und die Christliche Existenz, ed. by Leo Scheffczyk 




There are of course more salient features in Aquinas’s christology. I will 
mention only four: Aquinas’s position on the motive for the incarnation
5
, 
Aquinas’s denial of Mary’s immaculate conception
6
, Aquinas’s admission 
of a kind of knowledge in the human soul of Christ which is of an 
experiential nature
7






2. The linguistic and apophatic character of Aquinas’s christology 
 
There is yet another remarkable characteristic of Aquinas’s christology, that 
I worked out for myself some years ago. It concerns three general features of 
Aquinas’s christology: 
1) Aquinas’s christology is distinctly linguistic in character 
2) Aquinas’s christology forms the apex of his theology, and therefore 
definitively characterizes his conception of theology 
3) Aquinas’s christology bears a distinctly apophatic character. 
Let me briefly dwell on each of these points. 
 
2.1 Aquinas’s christology is distinctly linguistic in character. 
 
To elucidate this point I should like to mention Aquinas’s attention to 
grammatical modes of signification, such as the difference between concrete 
and abstract terms, between subject-term and predicate-term. There is also 
his attention to theories of predication and the logic of reduplication. On a 
more theological level, there is his attention to the names that Christ 
receives in Holy Scripture. In his commentary on Isaiah, Aquinas designs 
preaching schemes centred around the names of Christ, and employs them as 
exegetical principles in an explanation of the meaning of the Old Testament 
                                                                                                                            
Summa Theologiae des heiligen Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg etc. 1985); Jean-Pierre Torrell, Le 
Christ en ses Mystères. La Vie et l’Oeuvre de Jésus selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: 
Desclée, 1999), 2 vols. 
5 Cf. Rudolf Haubst, Vom Sinn der Menschwerdung. Cur Deus homo (München: Hüber 
Verlag, 1969); A. Michel, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, s.v. ‘incarnation’. 
6 Cf. Ulrich Horst, Die Diskussion um die Immaculata Conceptio im Dominikanerorden. 
Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der theologischen Methode (Paderborn etc.: Schöning, 1987). 
7 Johannes Theodorus Ernst, Die Lehre der hochmittelalterlichen Theologen von der 
vollkommenen Erkenntnis Christi. Ein Versuch zur Auslegung der klassischen Dreiteilung: Visio 
Beata, Scientia Infusa und Scientia Acquisita (Freiburg etc., 1971) 
8 A. Patfoort, L’unité d’être dans le Christ d’après Saint Thomas. A la croisée de 
l’ontologie et de la christologie (Paris 1964); Schoot, ‘Name’ of God, chapter 5.  
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and, for example the letters of Paul.. Sometimes they also are used as 
principles for the organization of theological quaestiones. Most 
fundamental, of course, is the way in which Aquinas, for example in his 
commentary on John 12, pictures Christ as being himself the name of God, 
the one who proclaims his God and makes him present among the nations; 
for Aquinas, Christ is the manifestation, the revelation of the good news, the 
good news in person. Further, and most importantly for his speculative 
christology, there is the distinction between two properties of terms, the 
distinction between signification and supposition. Signification roughly 
means what we understand by connotation, whereas supposition coincides 
with denotation. Sometimes words are used to stand for, to supposit for, an 
individual thing, and sometimes words signify an aspect of that thing; they 
are used to describe the thing indicated. In this vein the subject-term of a 
sentence has supposition, and the predicate-term signification, as in ‘Peter is 
courageous’.  
I think, all in all, that the linguistic character of Aquinas’s christology 
cannot be denied. The evidence is overwhelming, especially in the more 
speculative section of his christology. We will return to this shortly. 
 
2.2 Aquinas’s christology forms the apex of his theology, and therefore 
definitively characterizes  his conception of theology. 
 
Each interpreter of Aquinas’s thought is of course well aware of the 
discussion about the architecture, or order, of the Summa Theologiae.
9
 
Especially in the days in which Roman Catholic theology discovered the 
concept of history, and rediscovered the centrality of what was called the 
Christ-event, a number of typical questions were put to Aquinas. How do 
you already know what grace is, before you even begin to question the 
person and work of Christ? Why do you devote attention to his person only 
at the end of your Summa? But also: why do you speak about Father, Son 
and Spirit before even dwelling upon Jesus of Nazareth?  
These questions were partly answered by Edward Schillebeeckx, who in 
his De Sacramentele Heilseconomie ventured the thesis that the Tertia Pars 
in fact forms the point of culmination, the high point of Aquinas’s 
theological project. Aquinas’s conception of theology is theocentric, 
certainly, but the question that was formulated a couple of years ago at a 
conference at Notre Dame is certainly pertinent: isn’t Dominican theology 
just as christocentric as Franciscan theology is always claimed to be?
10
 
                                                     
9 See also the contribution to this volume by Brian Johnstone. 
10 K. Emery jr. and J. Wawrykow, Christ among the Medieval Dominicans: 
representations of Christ in the texts and images of the Order of Preachers (Notre Dame: 
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Well, one way to check the position of the christology as contained in the 
Tertia Pars vis-à-vis the doctrine of God and the Trinity as contained in the 
Prima Pars, is to check the way in which questions 12 and 13 of the Prima 
Pars, where Aquinas talks about our knowledge of God and our naming of 
God, are in fact applied in the Tertia Pars as well. Do the things Aquinas 
says about proper and improper speech, about metaphorical and analogical 
language, about propositions about the divine, apply in christology as well? 
And indeed, as it turns out, they do.  We will return shortly to this as well. 
 
2.3 Aquinas’s christology bears a distinctly apophatic character.  
 
Our third and last point, divine hiddenness, is a structural principle of 
Aquinas’s conception of theology.
11
 The way in which Aquinas employs the 
word mysterium, for example, organizes Scripture, articles of Faith, the 
sacrament of the Eucharist and christology in one interdependent whole. 
Both on the levels of signification and of supposition Aquinas seems well 
aware of the inadequacy, amid all the richness, of human interpretation and 
naming of the divine. In the final analysis, it is exactly Aquinas’s way of 
analysing the being of Christ, through a grammatical and logical analysis of 
propositions that contain the word est, as well as his interpretation of the 
definition of the council of Chalcedon, that confirms this interpretation of 
Aquinas’s views. The unity of Christ incarnate is located exactly in the 
‘space’ where no description can be given, where only pointing may be 
appropriate, or a nod   
 
This interpretation of Aquinas’s christology is not obvious. It goes against 
the tendency to put Aquinas before the cart of anti-modernism - to invest 
Aquinas with the apologetics of faith. It is not so much the deficiency of the 
knowledge of faith which is focused upon, but its relative efficiency. In this 
regard it is extremely interesting to learn about the way Henry of Gorkum 
interpreted Aquinas. Of all arguments, the weakest one is the argument from 
authority, the argument that says: ‘he said so as well’. But it is nice to see 
that one historical voice agrees, and not the least among them, because 
Henry was the first of Aquinas’ commentators. Let me explain.
12
 
                                                                                                                            
Notre Dame Press, 1998); 
11 Cf. William J. Hoye, ‘Die Unerkennbarkeit Gottes als die letzte Erkenntnis nach Thomas 
von Aquin’, in Thomas von Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen, ed. by 
A. Zimmermann (Berlin etc. 1988), 117-39 [Miscellanea Mediaevalia 19]. 
12 The following was published at greater length in ‘Language and Christology: the case of 
Henry of Gorkum († 1431), Thomist’, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 68 
(2001), 142-62.  
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3. Henry of Gorkum: biographical data 
 
The first commentators on Thomas Aquinas’ came from the Netherlands. 
Master Henry of Gorkum (Gorkum is a small town in the Netherlands 
between Utrecht and Rotterdam) completed his studies in Paris, and made a 
considerable career in Cologne, from 1419 onwards. Henry transposed what 
he took to be the central theological insights of Thomas into a literary form 
that was fit for educating students. What are these insights? In summarizing 
the Summa Theologiae and in writing a tract called De divinis nominibus, 
how did Henry introduce his students to the work of the person whom he 
deemed the most important theologian since Augustine?
13
 
Henry must have been born in 1377 or 1378 in Gorkum (Gorinchem), 
which at the time belonged to the Utrecht diocese, and died in Cologne in 
1431. The exact date of birth is unknown and postulated by Weiler, because 
Henry’s licentiate in the arts in Paris, is dated 1398. Henry was to study the 
arts, and subsequently to act as Magister artium between 1398 and 1402, 
and to become a student of theology. There are no records left of a Parisian 
licentiate in theology, but he must have obtained one, since he was able to 
receive his licentiate and doctorate in Cologne only shortly after his moving 
there in 1419. In 1410 he had resumed teaching the arts in Paris, but he left 
the city, which was in turmoil due to wars, famine and the plague, for a 
relatively quiet Cologne. Being a secular priest, Henry served as parish 
priest there, and being a well-respected scholar, he was professor of 
theology at the university. Next to this, Henry was famous for founding a 
school for young students, to provide for a good preparation for enrolling in 
the faculty of arts, and at the same time to provide an opportunity to further 
the cause of a renewed Thomism. For that was the cause for which Henry 
left Paris - since 1407 dedicated once more to realism instead of nominalism 
– for Cologne, where the original nominalism from the early beginnings of 
the university  had to compete with a via antiqua which was growing 
stronger and stronger.  
The conflicts concerning the via antiqua and the via modernorum seem to 
be first and foremost conflicts concerning the way in which learning should 
be organized: by studying and explaining the works of Aristotle or by a  
method that is less concerned with commenting on authoritative texts and 
                                                     
13 Tractatus de divinis nominibus, in: Tractatus consultatorii (Cologne: H. Quentell, 
1503), fol. 1-19r; Cf. A.G. Weiler, Heinrich von Gorkum († 1431). Seine Stellung in der 
Philosophie und der Theologie des Spätmitelalters (Hilversum etc. 1962), pp. 93-94 and 138-
49. Henry’s (Heinrich von Gorichem) Quaestiones in S. Thomam, was reprinted from a 1473 
edition (Esslingen) by Minerva, Frankfurt 1967. 
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more with a modus quaestionis and a terminist treatment of logical issues: 
study of the parva logicalia (in Cologne: supposition, ampliation, 
appellation, obligations, insolubles and consequences) and analysis of 
scientific demonstration. Cologne in fact had found a compromise, but the 
via antiqua was dominant. Attempting to avoid the controversial theological 
consequences of nominalism, and possibly faithful to the views of the 
Parisian chancellor Jean Gerson, Henry applied himself to providing an 
education  with a large number of writings, the paramount purpose of which 
must have been didactic in nature: logical works, philosophical works and 
most of all theological works. The latter include a Lectura super 
Evangelium, a compendium of the Summa Theologiae entitled Quaestiones 
in S. Thomam, Conclusiones super IV Libros Sententiarum, an adaptation of 
the Supplementum IIIae Partis Summae Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis, a 
number of treatises including treatises on the divine names, predestination 
and the Eucharist, and a treatise against the Hussites. 
In historical respect it is rather important that Grabmann and Weiler 
credit Henry with being the first commentator of the Summa Theologiae, 
and with being the first to put Aquinas in a central place in his teaching, 
about a century before Paris would do so, and cause Spanish Thomism to 
flourish.
14
 The thomistarum coloniensium monarcha, as he was called, 
seems to have been well-respected, a scholar with a clear mind, engaged in 
putting before his students the essentials of philosophical and theological 
learning, without undue sophistry, idle speculation or craving for polemics; 
an irenic and practical man, always willing to solve problems or intervene in 
academic or political matters; moreover someone who never sought 
originality or personal prestige. We will shortly encounter this. 
 
 
4. Henry of Gorkum: his interpretation of Aquinas’s theology and 
christology 
 
4.1 The prologues of De divinis nominibus 
 
‘Thy Name and thy memory is what my soul longs for’. It is this very 
quotation of Isaiah 26 that is chosen by Henry to act as the thread of his 
exposition of the divine names. In the general prologue he says that, 
whenever the soul forms a name of God in the hiddenness of the mind, it 
gives room for God himself. For this reason each devout person will say: 
                                                     
14 M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der 
Scholastik und Mystik, vol. 2 (München, 1936), p. 443; vol. 3 (München, 1956), p. 412.  
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‘Thy name and thy memory is what my soul longs for’ (f 1r). 
However, all names are deficient, since God is ever greater than all 
human knowledge of him. Both divine excellence and weakness of human 
understanding cause the inadequacy and the plurality of divine names. For 
novices in theology and others to speak more easily and confidently about 
God without fault, Henry collects insights concerning the divine names in a 
handbook of study. ‘Whenever we speak of the divine, we should act 
cautiously and modestly’, Henry says. 
15
 
Henry’s concern is with his students, and in line with this, with the public 
character of theology of speech about God. It is quite clear that De divinis 
nominibus is best interpreted as concerning not only divine names, but all 
speech about God. The contents of Henry’s treatise confirm this. The 
treatise is subdivided into three parts, the first of which covers the contents 
of STh I, q. 13 (de nominibus Dei), the second the theology of the Trinity, 
and the third the theology of Christ incarnate. Henry intends to proceed by 
propositions formulated on the basis of authentic sayings and rules, 
subjoining their causes and expositions. Henry formulates some 39 
propositions. The rules that he mentions are most interesting. Some of them 
will be examined later on, but in general one has to concede that their 
formulation stems from a practice of teaching in which a certain kind of 
theology has become dominant and is translated for the needs of students: 
the theology of Thomas Aquinas.  
In his prologue to the third distinction, Henry equates the name of God 
with the name of Christ that he deems most fundamental: Jesus. Henry dives 
into the middle of Aquinas’s sermo de Deo Salvatore (STh III, prol.), i.e. 
question 37, article 2: Utrum convenienter fuerit Christo nomen impositum, 
to come up with to a number of insights regarding the name Jesus. It belongs 
to those names that are imposed by  God. They always signify a divine gift 
bestowed upon the one named: Abraham, Peter. Such is the case with Jesus 
as well, since Christ was gifted with the grace to save all human beings. All 
the names that are attributed to Christ in some way signify the name Jesus. 
For example, Emmanuel signifies the cause of salvation, that is, the union of 
divine and human nature in the person of the Son by which he has become 
God with us. The eucharistic names of Christ are explicitly mentioned, and 
finally Henry concludes by quoting the letter to the Philippians (2, 10): in 
the name of Jesus every knee will bend etc. What our soul longs for is thus 
especially the name of its saviour, of Jesus; the name that the Song of Songs 
(1, 2) calls ‘an oil poured out’. 
                                                     
15 ‘quia ex verbis inordinatis prolatis incurritur heresis’, ‘ideo cum de divinis loquimur 
cum cautela et modestia est agendum’ (f. 1r). 
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From the contents of these prologues it may confidently be concluded that 
the christological part of this treatise, on naming the divine, constitutes its 
climax. In this respect Henry shows himself to be a faithful student of 
Aquinas, whom he quotes, but never bothers to mention. According to 
Henry, there is an evident link between Aquinas’s treatise on divine names, 
on the divine persons and on God the saviour, since all of them revolve 
around language in divinis: its inadequacy, its truth, its rules and its 
spirituality. 
 
4.2 The first distinction of De divinis nominibus 
 
One of the features of the treatise that supports this conclusion is the 
absence of an essential part of question 13 of Aquinas’s Prima Pars of his 
Summa Theologiae in Henry’s first distinction. Henry catalogues and 
considers different concrete names, but fails to mention article 12 of q. 13 
that, apart from some rather vague remarks in proposition 10, seems to be 
missing. The reason for this is simple, but telling. Article 12 concerns the 
question whether affirmative propositions may be formed about God. 
Aquinas’s main tool in composing an affirmative answer is the distinction 
between signification secundum rem, and signification secundum rationem, 
i.e. between supposition (denotation) and signification (connotation). Each 
proposition affirms a real identity between that which is denoted by the 
subject term, and connoted by the predicate-term. The fact that the 
proposition is composed of several terms is due to our mode of 
understanding and signification, but does not eo ipso imply a real 
composition in the subject about which the proposition is formed. Therefore 
no violation of God’s simplicity is committed. In the course of his 
determination Aquinas employs the rule that predicate-terms are to be 
interpreted formally, and subject-terms materially. This is the same 
distinction between signification and supposition but formulated in different 
words: predicates signify or connote the form, whereas subject-terms 
supposit or stand for (denote) the existing thing. The distinction between 
supposition and signification can be omitted by Henry in his first part, since 
it is the basic insight underlying all analysis of christological language. In 
other words, as he must be economical in this short treatise, Henry must 
have thought: I will shortly come to those matters when discussing 
christological language. And indeed, he does so. For in christologicis a clear 
distinction between supposit or person and natures, between the 
interpretation of the subject-term and the predicate-term, between 
supposition and signification is fundamental. For this reason, Henry selects 
Aquinas’s questions on whether Christ is a compositum, on the 
communicatio idiomatum, and on the being of Christ. 
 10 
From this and other elements we may conclude that Henry is well aware 
of the christological relevance of the general treatise of the divine names. 
 
4.3 The third distinction of De divinis nominibus 
 
In the course of his treatment of christological language, Henry unfolds 
thirteen propositions, in all respects according to the order of the Tertia 
Pars.
16
 The first proposition could be translated as: ‘A sound foreknowledge 
of the mode of union of the Word Incarnate is the most favourable proem for 
rightly speaking about the divine incarnation’.
17
 Nothing could better reach 
the heart of the matter. The twofold stress on the fact that knowledge of the 
mode of the union precedes the rest is telling. Henry considers questions 2-
15 as presuppositions for christological language. For that is the part which 
Aquinas subsumes under ‘de modo unionis Verbi Incarnati’ (STh III, q. 2 
prol.). Questions 16-26 are ‘de his quae consequuntur unionem’ (STh III, q. 
16 prol.), and one expects Henry to count these as belonging to the 
‘favourable proem’ as well. As a result one has to notice that all 
propositions Henry formulates belong to this area. Consequently, everything 
that follows has to be regarded as a prolegomenon, a proem to actual 
christological language. This is quite important to note, since otherwise one 
might be tempted to discard this kind of reflection on account of its lack of 
historical or soteriological interest: it does not intend to do that job nor 
suggest that it should not be done at all, it just considers it fruitful to 
formulate a proem so that the conditions of possibility of ‘loquendi recte de 
divina incarnatione’ will be fulfilled. How important that is for Henry is the 
subject of the first lines, where he says that from such knowledge all ability 
depends on discerning between language fitting or unfitting for the mystery 
of the incarnation.
18
 One should note the use of sermones convenientes et 
disconvenientes. Henry ends his treatment, saying that, on the basis of this 
material,  a perceptive reader will be able to judge which christological 
language to prefer.
19
 At the end of the third prologue he talks about 
                                                     
16 The order is as follows: the hypostatic union (1-3), the grace and knowledge of Christ 
(4-5), the communicatio idiomatum in speaking about Christ (6), the being of Christ (7), the 
will and operations (8), prayer and priesthood (9), predestination and adoration (10), mediator 
and son of his virgin mother (11), nativities (12), and sorrow and joy on the cross (13). One 
easily recognizes the original order of treatment in STh III. 
17 ‘Modum unionis verbi incarnati sane precognoscere, pulcerrimum est prohemium 
loquendi recte de divina incarnatione’, f. 13v. 
18 ‘a tali cognitione dependet tota ars discernendi inter sermones convenientes et 
disconvenientes circa mysterium incarnationis dum pretendimus Deo attribuere propositiones 
vi incarnationis noviter emergentes’, f. 13v. 
19 ‘Ex quibus potest sollers lector perpendere quos sermones catholicos debeat proferre, 
 
 11 
propositions ‘containing the art of enunciating faithfully the language 
(sermo) emerging because of the incarnation’.
20
 The expression sermones 
must be taken literally. Henry is engaged in explaining and interpreting the 
very wording of fundamentally sound propositions concerning Christ. The 
first proposition explains how the mode of the union should be understood, 
and the other propositions indicate what kind of words and propositions fit 
that mode. Were the mode to be otherwise, other locutions would be needed. 
‘Union’ and ‘assumption’, and their different forms, are key words in 
christology, but they possess highly different semantics. What can be said 
with the one, cannot be said with the other and vice versa. For instance, the 
one who unites can be said to be the one united, whereas the one who 
assumes cannot be said to be the one assumed; it can truly be said that 
human nature is united to divine nature or that divine nature is united to 
human nature, but to say that divine nature is assumed by human nature is 
not correct. Thus a number of semantic differences are brought to the fore, 
entailing a different True/False analysis of certain propositions. Such is 
Henry’s linguistic interpretation of STh III, q. 3, contained in his second 
proposition. Easily done, he says, for someone who has the right conception 
of the mode of the hypostatic union. The same linguistic reading is 
undertaken concerning the subject of STh III, q. 4 on ‘that which is assumed’ 
in the hypostatic union. In proposition 4 he does so by analysing the terms 
‘person’, ‘human being’, ‘carnal body’ and ‘soul’ when employed in the 
expression ‘Filius Dei assumpsit ...’. 
Propositions 4 - 12 all regard the truth or falseness of a large number of 
expressions about Christ. The most important of these is proposition 6, 
Henry’s interpretation of STh III, q. 16: This proposition states that, if one 
applies some rules that are common in the sciences to the holy incarnate 
union, it will be easy to speak justly in the communication of property-
terms.
21
 In the course of his treatment, Henry identifies six rules of a 
semantic nature, the application of which facilitates the analysis of 
propositions about Christ. The first two of these are most important, since 
they lay out the principles of supposition and signification. They are taken 
literally from STh III, q. 16 a. 1. The first concerns the logical status of the 
subject-term [e.g. this tree is x], and the second of the predicate-term [e.g. x 
                                                                                                                            
scilicet consurgentes ratione incarnationis salutifere, quod fuit tercium peragendam in hac 
compilatione’, f. 18v. 
20 ‘propositiones artem continentes fideliter enunciandi sermonem vigore incarnationis 
emergentem’, f. 13v. 
21 Communicatio idiomatum or exchange of property-terms is possible in christologicis 
because of the personal union of both natures in Christ. Thus it is true to say that ‘This man 
(Christ) is omnipotent’, as well as ‘The Son of God is suffering’. 
 12 
is a tree]. The first could be paraphrased as: ‘Every concrete name with 
connotation, can denote something which belongs to the class connoted’.
22
 
The second as: ‘Of everything that belongs to a certain nature a predicate-
term may truly and properly be said which concretely connotes that 
nature’.
23
 The distinction of these two main modes of signification already 
animated the very reflection on the mode of the union, since a distinction 
was made there between supposit or person, the object of supposition, and 
natures, the object of signification. But now the linguistic reading is 
developed in full, interpreting “Deus est homo” and “Homo est Deus”. On 
grounds of the second rule mentioned, the predicate-term homo can 
truthfully be said of Deus, since the predicate-term connotes a nature by 
which the supposit of Deus exists, even though Deus does not signify or 
connote that (human) nature. The truth of Homo est Deus depends on both 
rules: the subject-term is taken to stand for the supposit of both human and 
divine nature, the latter of which is signified by the predicate-term. Thus the 
constitution of the linguistic rule of the communicatio idiomatum is laid out. 
For it is on the basis of the truth of both propositions mentioned, together 
with the rules of supposition and signification, that it can be said that (the 
Son of) God was passible, was mortal and is temporal, or that this man is 
impassible, immortal and eternal. Having outlined the communication of 
property-terms, Henry for the first and only time in this treatise, except for 
the prologues, employs a prayerful and vocative style. It indicates the awe 
and mystery that he encounters.
24
  
                                                     
22 ‘Nam regula est quod nomen significans naturam communem in concreto potest 
supponere pro quolibet contentorum in natura communi’, f. 16r. 
23 ‘Secunda regula est quod de quolibet supposito alicuius nature potest vere et proprie 
predicari nomen significans illam naturam in concreto’, f. 16r. 
24 ‘O pie Iesu quam recte dixisti ore: “Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me” [Ps 138, 6], 
quia almiflua tua incarnatione priorum phylosophorum scientia obstupuit audiens veritates 
ante insolitas ut quod immortale est mortale, eternum est temporale, omnipotens est infirmus, 
superdives est egenus, immensum est in virginis utero clausum, Virgo peperit, Deus esurit 
etc.’, f. 16v. The rule that he formulates, silently quoted from STh III, q. 16 a. 4, seems 
incomprehensible without the latter’s context. Aquinas stresses that it is forbidden to reserve 
the human predicates for Christus homo and the divine predicates for Christus Deus, even 
though one has to distinguish between the different meanings of the predicates. All predicates 
are truthfully said of Christus homo as well as of Christus Deus: ‘Regula tamen est notanda 
qua dicitur quod “in propositione in qua aliquid de aliquo predicatur, non solum attenditur 
quid sit illud” quod predicatur et “de quo predicatur, sed etiam secundum quid”. Unde de 
eodum supposito et subiecto predicantur in concreto ea quae sunt nature divine, et ea quae 
sunt nature assumpte. Sed tamen dicuntur [distinguuntur - HS] ea secundum quam 
predicantur predicata’, f. 16v. 
24 ‘Quia vero regula est, quod unius rei est tantum unum esse simpliciter. Hinc est quod 






Considering Henry’s presentation of Aquinas’s first part of his sermo de 
Christo, on the conditions of possibility of actual speech about Christ, it 
may be concluded that in no respect whatsoever does Henry innovate, or 
even improve, on Aquinas. On the contrary, he stays very close to his hero. 
The interesting part of his explanation, however, is the way in which he 
brings out clearly the logical and linguistic underpinnings of Aquinas’s 
treatment.  
Henry considers the topic of the divine names to be at the heart of 
Aquinas’s theological authorship. This is important both in a historical and a 
systematic respect. The oldest of known commentators guides us in 
interpreting the work of Aquinas. Moreover, for Henry it is evident that 
Aquinas’s more general analysis of divine names applies to Christ as well. 
In this respect Henry renders explicit what the Summa Theologiae leaves 
only implicit. While Aquinas’s (and Henry’s) sermo de Christo is devoted 
solely to names that are attributed to Christ incarnate, supposing prior 
treatment of names for the Eternal Son in the course of trinitarian theology, 
the main emphasis is on (composed) propositions of which STh III q. 16 and 
17 are the best examples. But Henry shows excellently why Aquinas can say 
that qq. 16 and 17 flow forth from a prior understanding of the mode of the 
hypostatic union: the latter works with a distinction between signification 
and supposition which guides the explicit analysis of propositions in qq. 16 
and 17. This entails a third and last point of interest of Henry’s treatise. If 
Aquinas’s general treatise on divine names applies to the sermo de Christo 
as well, then this also goes for the negative, apophatic character of 
Aquinas’s general treatise. Once again it makes explicit what in the STh III 
remains implicit, and for which one has to adduce Aquinas’s commentary on 
Isaiah, for example, where he quotes Proverbs (30, 4): ‘What is his name, 
and what is the name of his son, do you know?’ 
Henry shows Aquinas’s christology to be linguistic, to be centred around 
names and naming, to be intrinsically connected with the general doctrine of 
God, and to be apophatic in character. The interest is more in what he shows 
                                                                                                                            
secundum se. Et quia in Christo est tantum una hypostasis cui natura humana coniungitur 
hypostatice et non accidentaliter, hinc est quod Christo secundum humanam naturam non 
advenit novum esse personale, sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis preexistentis ad 
naturam humanam, ut scilicet illa persona iam dicatur subsistere, non solum secundum 
naturam divinam, sed etiam humanam. Sicut si post constitutionem persone fortis advenirent 
forti pedes, manus vel oculi, non adveniret forti aliud esse sed solum quaedam relatio ad 
huiusmodi’, f. 17r. 
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than in what he says,  in how he selects from the Summa Theologiae. The 
things he says do not improve on Aquinas, but form a precious key to the 
larger corpus of Aquinas’s christology and theology. 
